Wilfrid Sellars' myth of the Given is useful to consider here, given that there's no epistemically efficacious but non-inferential sensory given. When I perceive a cat, and believe that there is a cat before me, there are a set of inferential consequences to this belief, eg. that the cat will scratch me if I pet it. And if the cat is merely a hallucination, I will not get a bloody hand, and so on.
Wilfrid Sellars' myth of the Given is useful to consider here, given that there's no epistemically efficacious but non-inferential sensory given. When I perceive a cat, and believe that there is a cat before me, there are a set of inferential consequences to this belief, eg. that the cat will scratch me if I pet it. And if the cat is merely a hallucination, I will not get a bloody hand, and so on.