Plato's Theory of Forms

Written under test conditions in class, IB HL Philosophy

Explain Plato’s concept of a Form

We can parse our understanding of the Theory of Forms in two distinct senses: the metaphysical and the epistemological.

From a metaphysical point of view, the Forms are ‘what is’. The exist in an eternal, abstract, realm that is distinct from our physical world, whose contents merely participate in the Forms.

For instance, a beautiful vase participates in the Form of beauty; that it is beautiful is the direct consequence of it sharing its essence with the Form of beauty in this way.

The Forms exist in a hierarchical structure: at the apex is the Form of the good, which is likened to the sun, in that it provides light and nourishment; then there are the abstract Forms, such as beauty and justice, which participate in the Form of the good. Then there are mathematical forms: numbers, and shapes (the ‘perfect circle’ that cannot exist in our physical world) and the like. The study of mathematics (and hence understanding of the mathematical Forms) is, for Plato, a precursor to becoming a philosopher – one who knows the Forms.

The second sense in which we understand the forms is epistemological. The Forms are the object of knowledge: that is to say, Plato distinguishes between knowledge and opinion in terms of their distinct objects, since the faculty of knowledge and opinion are distinct in the mind and so ‘point at’ different things. Thus we can have no knowledge of the physical world, only opinions; we can only know the Forms.

Each form is singular. This means that though of course there are many things that are beautiful, there is only one Form of beauty; many just things, but only one Form of justice. Similarly, negations of the Forms are part of the one also; there is no Form of ugliness or of injustice – these are just the other side of the respective coins of the Form of beauty and the Form of justice. Thus we see that the forms are both singular, and exemplary; and they are the object towards which the faculty of knowledge is directed; and the only inhabitants of ‘true’ reality, according to Plato.

Plato’s concept of a Form is incoherent: discuss

Plato, with the Theory of Forms, is attempting for the first time in the history of Western philosophy to distinguish between knowledge, which is objective, and opinion, which is subjective. The distinction is a necessary one, as if there is no clear distinction, we lose hold of paradigmatically important notions in our day-to-day lives: […], for instance, and lying.

Though credit must be given for his attempt to do so, and the incidental side-effect of kickstarting the Western philosophical tradition – which has occasionally proven useful – this essay will go on to argue that the Theory of Form is incoherent, or at least, in need of development.

One can see where Plato is coming from here. We know intuitively that some things are good, and some things are beautiful; and yet we recognise that we can sensibly speak about beauty itself, or the concept of beauty. Plato’s attempt to abstract away the essence, or concepts of these things makes sense of intuitive facts of which we are cognizant. For instance, that the corruption of some beautiful things does not corrode the essence of beauty itself – to Plato, the unchanging Form of beauty.

However, Plato does not justify his leap that the Forms simply are, and they are mind-independent. It seems clear, or at least probable, that our minds have evolved to be capable of abstraction, and it is us abstracting away the essence of various things and considering them. This would mean that they are dependent on culture – one’s society’s idea of justice may be drastically different to another’s conception of it: each of them are capable of abstracting what they recognise as justice and calling it so, but it would entail their dependency on minds, which Plato asserts they are not.

We can also note a detail in Plato’s theory that is unexplained, leading to a dichotomy with no obviously desirable outcome. This is concerned with the scope of the Forms: it is left open to interpretation whether they are purely abstract, or whether there can be Forms of physical things: the Form of a table, for instance, in which all physical tables participate, and whose essence e recognise therein.

Suppose that the Forms are purely abstract. This limits what we can know severely, even what we may consider to be self-evident. WE cannot verify or disprove the claim, “Socrates is a man” – there is no ‘Form of a man’ that Socrates may or may not be participating in: the Forms are purely abstract!

Suppose instead then that the Forms may well include physical things, such as computers or chairs. Then we must understand the realm of Forms as containing the Form of a computer; can we also have Forms of different models? After all, these too have some essence we recognise. And individual models have variations and idiosyncrasies – must there be Forms of all these? And so on, until Plato’s eternal realm of Forms seems a mere caricature, an infinite realm containing one of every object to be found.

This hole in the theory of Forms is near-fatal, and Plato fails to deal with the nature of the Forms effectively.

Aristotle also levelled some significant criticism of the Forms, not necessarily with the logical consistency of the theory, but also of the validity of the inferences Plato draws.

He argues, for instance, that understanding something’s essence or abstraction, understanding something’s Form misses several salient details of the object we seek to understand. By the very nature of abstraction, we obfuscate key details that may be relevant to us in the physical world – the thing’s composition, for instance, as well as its purpose and its cause.

This criticism is a strong one, and throws into question Plato’s contention that rulers ought to be philosophers, knowers of the Forms.

Aristotle also argues that Plato’s Forms prove useless in moral cases. Plato’s insistence on moral absolutism (an understandable reaction to the pitfalls of pure relativism( means that he asserts that there is a Form of justice, and of the good, that one who knows the Forms can understand and therefore be truly good and just.

However, even knowledge of the Form of the good tells us very little about how we are to live our lives, for similar reasons to the previous point. That is, the good course of action in our quotidian ongoings are situationally dependent. Abstractions of what it is to be good in principle are utterly useless indicators of how we ought to act in normal life. These things cannot be derived from pure reason in Plato’s conception’ experience and good will, in general, are much better predictors and guides of how we should traverse life on the ethical front.

Therefore it has been shown that Plato’s theory of Forms, though a commendable effort that has held up as the foundation of Western philosophy for two thousand years, ultimately fails, due to both its shortcomings in terms of what is explained, and putative interpretations thereof. The next couple of millennia of footnotes to Plato will prove fruitful progress, that is much needed.

Result

Mark: 21/25

Feedback:

· Part a): 8/10

o Accurate and articulate understanding in evidence – well-organised.

· Part b): 13/15

o V. good understanding evident – most importantly combined with genuine engagement in a developing discussion. Well done – repeat it!