Plato's Conception of Justice

Written under test conditions in class, IB HL Philosophy

a)    Explain Plato’s conception of justice

Plato’s account of justice is discussed in the context of an analogy between the just city and the just soul. It is intended to contend with Thrasymachus’ ‘might makes right’ definition, whereby justice is defined by those with the power to define it in their own interests.

Like Plato, we shall begin with the just city. It is based on the principle of specialisation – the teleological idea that each individual is naturally suited for a particular function, and that his happiness (eudaimonia) is found in fulfilling it.

The city has three classes, encompassed by individuals suited to their own class. Each represents a cardinal virtue. Wisdom is found in the Guardian class who administer the city in the interests of the whole. Courage is the realm of the Auxiliary class, who defend the city from internal or external threats. Self-discipline is found in the Artisan class, the producers and consumers (of food, housing, etc.)

As per the principle of specialisation then, each individual is suited to his class because of the disposition of his soul. Indeed, Socrates argues the just city will require a ‘myth of metals’, an abstraction teaching the citizens of the just city that his soul is born with a mixture of gold, silver or bronze, the ratio of which determine his class. This is to emphasise the fact than an individual’s position in society is divinely ordained and part of the natural order.

This is similar to what he contends the actual fact of the matter is – that the soul is split into appetites, desire, and reason. Justice in the soul, as in the city, is found in the harmony of all these elements, ruled by reason. Take an individual Guardian: we have established that he is wise, and this wisdom is nothing more than a dominant reasoning faculty in his soul. Similarly, courage is a dominant desiring/appetite faculty; and self-discipline is a dominant desiring faculty.

The just city is just because it is composed of just individuals – where else would the justice come from? And in both, justice is found in specialisation and fulfilling one’s natural function, being harmonious and balanced: in order.

One other relevant detail is that justice is a Form for Plato: an abstract, intangible, but real thing, on which all instantiations of it are based. In his conception of justice, therefore, the just city must be ruled by philosopher-kings; a philosopher being someone who knows the Forms, and so their perspective on justice is knowledge, rather than opinion, as they see how justice in their world relates to the Form of justice, which of course, is the paragon of it.

Therefore it has been explained how Plato uses the principle of specialisation and a tripartite soul to construct the just city and the just soul, representing his conception of justice as harmony, and justice as a Form.

b)   Evaluate Plato’s conception of justice.

In this answer, which will consider three key areas of debate, I shall argue that Plato offers an unsatisfactory account of justice.

We may first pit it against what can be termed as a ‘liberal/egalitarian’ view of justice – the notion, say, of justice as fairness as promoted by Rawls. This view would argue that Plato’s conception has no scope for individual autonomy since it assumes individuals are naturally suited for a particular task, based on their dominant faculty.

This is greatly at adds with the liberty principle of the liberal/egalitarian view of justice which assumes that humans are free individuals with the capacity and right to formulate their own conception of the good life, so long as their actions don’t infringe on others’ freedoms.

Because these two views are so different, it is hard to generate any meaningful debate of the two.

Plato would see liberal justice as anarchical and therefore highly unjust. Man, after all, is a social animal, and he needs a structured, ordered form of justice to work in a society, rather than just be individuals pursing their own self-interest.

Liberals, on the other hand, Karl Popper for instance, would see Plato’s just city’ as a totalitarian nanny state, more akin to Nazi Germany or Stalin’s Russia than a desirable state of being.

Since these views are so immiscible, we shall move on and see if any other criticisms can hold up.

One issue, arguably, with Plato’s conception of justice is that issues arise with the city/soul analogy. If, as Plato tells us, the just city is just because it is full of just souls, is each soul in the harmony he describes, with reason leading? It seems that this description applies only to the Guardians, who are a minority in the city, relatively speaking. Thus Plato’s idea of the individual being a microcosm of the state falls, and with it, his idea of justice.

This may be a misinterpretation, however: such a point seems far too obvious, and it may be rather, that the just city is just because it contains the correct ratio of just souls making a just city.

Since this is unclear, again, the arguments seem indecisive. We now move onto the point of results: does Plato’s teleological axiom and the principle of specialisation hold up so that his construction of justice gives a just soul reason to not steal, torture, or kidnap?

Plato, of course, would respond yes – an ordered soul, led by a rational faculty exercising wisdom – would not commit the paradigm cases of unjust, eminently undesirable acts, because they lead to a disharmony of the soul. Stealing or betraying someone, for example, leads to lack of trust between individuals, causing fragmentation and disorder. 

However, we turn back to the purpose of Socrates’ tirade on justice: to present an alternative to the ‘might makes right’ view, taken to its archetypal extreme in the Ring of Gyges story. It is not clear that a just person with the Ring of Gyges has no reason not to say, steal small, unnoticeable things, assured he can get away with it. Plato’s conception is far too concerned with harmony, balance, an ordering of parts, to take note of these issues. Analogously, even a just city in Plato’s eyes has no reason to have qualms about wiping their enemies into oblivion if they felt threatened and had the capacity to pre-emptively do so.

Plato’s conception failed to satisfactory deal with this ‘ordinary’ account of justice, and as a result, it seems, at the very least, incomplete.

Result

Mark: 20/25

Feedback:

· Part a): 8/10

o A fulsome and articulate account – ensure that all points are directly relevant.

· Part b): 12/15

o Likewise, fulsome and articulate – ensure that (a) is concise enough to allow plenty of time to develop (b).