Explain Kant's distinction between public and private use of reason; and then critically reflect on its soundness and its political consequences in terms of individual freedom

Submitted for PH143 (Existence, Experience, History: Key Topics in Continental Philosophy) Coursework.

In this essay, I shall address the distinction that Kant sought to make between public and private use of reason in his 1784 essay, “An Answer to the Question ‘What is Enlightenment?’”. I will explain Kant’s thinking on this question throughout that essay, and ultimately argue that the two are not as distinct as Kant suggests, so that his proposal that freedom should be constrained to one but not the other to accelerate the Enlightenment is flawed.

The “age of enlightenment” was a period of time in the 17th to 18th centuries that saw a surge in intellectual, philosophical, and scientific activity: the values of reason and individualism, religious tolerance, and political egalitarianism transformed (primarily) Western Europe.

In “An Answer to the Question ‘What is Enlightenment?’”, Kant identifies the period as a transitory age, as “man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity”. By this, he means people were beginning at last to have confidence in their ability to use their own understanding and reason, rather than deferring always to “dogmas and formulas” or to those who “set themselves up as their guardians”.

The prerequisite of this transition from immaturity is the freedom for the individual to think freely and act autonomously. But Kant recognises there are situations in which suspending this freedom seems socially necessary, as when a tax official demands compliance without debate. He argues that such impositions on the so-called “private use of reason” – which refers to one’s exercise of reason in one’s capacity as a member of an institution or society – are justified, since they are orthogonal to the “public enlightening”. It would be wholly inappropriate for a clergyman, employed specifically to preach to his congregation in accordance with a particular doctrine, to dwell before them on his personal critiques of that doctrine. The freedom of a soldier to use his own reason to reject the commands of his officer, or of a citizen to refuse to pay his taxes on the grounds of his economic views likewise have no effect on the public enlightenment, and may thus be restricted. The only stipulation is that each of these could propound his considered views on theology, military strategy, or fiscal policy in a public forum – perhaps with a view to influence future policies or societal norms, whilst nevertheless adhering to their responsibilities within their respective institutions.

It is this public use of man’s reason that must always be free. There may be no restrictions on one’s liberty to form one’s view on a subject and explicate that view for “the entire reading public”, however controversial, in one’s capacity as “a man of learning” – that is, as an individual, rather than as a cog in a machine. If the sovereign fulfils his duty to allow such public debate, and the individual fulfils his duty to reason autonomously whilst obeying the sovereign, then enlightenment and progress through reason can truly flourish.

Kant’s account of this distinction between public and private use of reason, and their relation to the Enlightenment, raises several questions. In contemporary societies, it is not clear that the two “spheres” can be separated so neatly. Anything that one writes or says in the public sphere reflects not only on the individual, but on the institution with which he is associated. This is true in almost any conceivable modern context: a Cabinet Minister cannot implement the policy of her government whilst publicly speculating about its merits, without violating collective responsibility (Gay & Powell, 2004); a priest’s public musings about the failures of scripture would doubtless be seen by his congregation and engender uneasiness in them or his superiors, however faithful his preaching; and corporations can face backlash if their employees publicly express views contrary to the company’s position, so that an employee’s ‘public reasoning’ contravenes his private obligation not to do harm to the company. The consequence of this is a significant limitation on individual freedom as people cannot publicly express controversial view, fearing this could damage their job prospects or employment status, and thus their ability to make a living; and this self-censorship stifles the quality of public discourse and the progress of Enlightenment.

Therefore, Kant’s distinction is not sound in the contemporary age. Two contingent facts of the modern world explain this: the Internet allows instant universal transmission; and the “reading public” includes effectively all people. But suppose that, as in Kant’s time, these things were not true. Then Kant’s conception of Enlightenment being catalysed by the freedom of men qua rational thinkers reasoning publicly, although it maintains the possibility of the two spheres being compartmentalised, excludes that significant portion of the population who cannot participate in public intellectual discourse. This too is a limitation on the insights that can be gleaned from such discourse, since fewer people can contribute their ideas and judgements. But it is also a great obstacle to individual freedom in Kant’s account – for these people, there is only the sphere of obedience.

Whether in Kant’s time or in our own, the distinction necessarily undermines individual freedom whenever critical reasoning is restricted only to the public sphere. This criticism is raised by Michel Foucault in his 1984 essay, “What is Enlightenment?”. He acknowledges Kant’s emphasis on freedom of thought as a cornerstone of the Enlightenment, but seeks to go further. He says, “There is Enlightenment when the universal, the free, and the public use of reason are superimposed.” He is advocating a rethinking of the distinction between the private and public use of reason, recognising that these categories are in fact deeply interconnected. Public enlightenment cannot occur if the freedom to think is confined only to the public sphere. Only when the separation of the public and the private is overcome, when freedom of thought is allowed to permeate both our roles as individual contributors within institutional and social structures and our engagement in open, public discourse, and when such freedom is available to all people, can the true essence of enlightenment be achieved.

Hence, Kant’s distinction between private and public use of reason is conceptually coherent, though it has broken down over time. But in analysing the nature of the two domains, it is clear that trying to restrict freedom of expression only to the public sphere is far too restrictive on individual freedom, and that it is therefore not a sound framework for bringing about an enlightened public. Instead, as Foucault argues, there must be a convergence of the free and public use of reason for all people in all parts of life for a public enlightenment to take hold.

Bibliography

Foucault, M., 1984. What is Enlightenment?. In: P. Rainbow, ed. The Foucault Reader. s.l.:Pantheon Books, pp. 32-50.

Gay, O. & Powell, T., 2004. The collective responsibility of Ministers - an outline of the issues. [Online] Available at: https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP04-82/RP04- 82.pdf

Kant, I., 1991. An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?". In: H. Reiss, ed. Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 54-60

Result

Mark: 74% (Low First)

Feedback:

This is a very high-quality work that demonstrates excellent knowledge, understanding and accuracy, good analysis and research, and is very clearly structured/presented. I found your use of contemporary examples and circumstances to critique Kant’s distinction especially interesting. Perhaps this essay could have been even stronger if you were to delve more into potential responses to some of your critiques (e.g. a potential argument that the private-public distinction could still be upheld in contemporary democratic states). However, given the space constraints I completely understand that this may not have been possible. Great job on this!

Advice on how to improve for future assignments:

• You are already raising interesting problems for philosophical views. See if you can develop your arguments even further.

• Similarly, when affirming an alternative view from secondary sources/other philosophical authors (e.g. Foucault), see if you can critically engage with these further by constructing independent arguments as to why you are affirming said perspective.

• When referencing or citing from a source, be sure to give all necessary information, including page numbers.